ABSTRACT As modern systems continue to increase in size and complexity, current systems security practices lack an effective approach to prioritize and tailor systems security efforts to successfully develop and field systems in challenging operational environments. This paper uniquely proposes seven systemagnostic security domains, which assist in understanding and prioritizing systems security engineering (SSE) efforts. To familiarize the reader with the state-of-the-art in SSE practices, we first provide a comprehensive discussion of foundational SSE concepts, methodologies, and frameworks. Next, the seven system-agnostic security domains are presented for consideration by researchers and practitioners. The domains are intended to be representative of a holistic SSE approach, which is universally applicable to multiple systems classes and not just a single-system implementation. Finally, three examples are explored to illustrate the utility of the system-agnostic domains for understanding and prioritizing SSE efforts in information technology systems, Department of Defense weapon systems, and cyber-physical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
As modern systems continue to increase in size and complexity, security is not adequately addressed, resulting in key stakeholders becoming susceptible to attacks from intelligent adversaries and a considerable array of disruptive events [40] . These vulnerabilities often result in business and mission losses when assets (i.e., people, processes, and technology) are insufficiently protected; thus, allowing for system faults, degradation, misuse, abuse, and security violations. Such losses can even result in mission failure and financial ruin, as well as, reduced trust from key stakeholders.
In a recent call to arms, Principal Deputy to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering Kristen Baldwin stresses the need for integration and formalization of Systems Security Engineering (SSE) methods, processes, and tools into established systems engineering efforts [1] . More specifically, it identifies three key trends which pose serious security challenges to modern programs and systems. The first challenge describes how systems increasingly rely on commercially available technologies; whether open source or proprietary, cost-conscience commercial technologies are seldom manufactured with security in mind [1] . This means, adversaries across the world can purchase, reverse engineer, and identify vulnerabilities in critical systems, sub-systems, and components more easily. The second challenge to systems security is accountability during acquisition. Complex supply chains often obfuscate the point of origin and composition of system components. Furthermore, with multiple tiers of prime contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers, the chain of custody often becomes confusing and misreported. The third challenge is the increasingly complex, dynamic, and interconnectedness of systems (i.e., large Systems-of-Systems with many networked interactions). This results in difficulty proving that systems, across their execution states and modes, are secure. Moreover, extensive dependencies may lead to the concealment of lingering vulnerabilities.
To address the SSE problem holistically, this work proposes seven system-agnostic (or system-neutral) security domains to examine its constituent parts. While the term ''domain'' may invoke particular implications depending on the context of its use, we use it here to refer to design principles and concepts at a system-agnostic intended for universal applicability across a broad range of systems. This level of abstraction is desirable to promote systems thinking and an overarching view of systems security ideas within the systems engineering specialty domain of SSE [2] . Note that this ''systems'' approach is in contrast to most security approaches which promote a rather narrow view of specific security concerns within a particular application domain (e.g., mobile computing or cloud storage systems). The domains described in this work discuss issues pertinent to all system types regardless of their application. In doing so, we also hope to help practitioners and researchers uncover additional areas of study, as the introduction of these abstracted domains themselves do not sufficiently solve the overarching issues of SSE complexity and non-uniformity across the spectrum of possible systems; rather, they provide opportunities for expansion of the concept. We stress that the proposed systemagnostic domains are not intended to be formal specifications but merely provide an example of how security domains can be defined and utilized for studying various Systems of Interest (SoI).
The article is organized as follows. In Section II, a comprehensive discussion of SSE concepts, methodologies, and frameworks is provided for the reader. We also outline their respective security domains, noting that the preponderance of existing frameworks are intended for Information Technology (IT) and cybersecurity applications. Section III proposes seven system-agnostic security domains for understanding how to more effectively apply SSE efforts. This work is not intended to provide a new standard, but rather an approach for prioritizing the SSE processes, activities, and tasks as described in the recently published National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-160 Systems Security Engineering [14] .
Section IV provides example methods and suggestions for developing prioritization schemes based on the importance (or criticality) of each security domain according to the particular SoI type or class. Finally, in Section V, we conclude with a discussion on the implications of our work and outline future research goals. Ultimately, this work seeks to extend the baseline knowledge of systems security engineers and those responsible for executing SSE roles and responsibilities [43] .
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we offer the reader foundational background knowledge on the development of SSE. In doing so, we note that the majority of security literature speaks to security only from an IT or cybersecurity perspective. While systems security has been studied for many decades, a fully encompassing philosophy ensuring that our daily personal and professional activities remain secure has yet to surface due to a lack of fundamental science underlying current security practices [42] .
A. HISTORY OF SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING (SSE)
Early security research efforts by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) focused on the challenge of how to build and assure computing systems with the correct level of protection [6] , [34] . These efforts culminated in the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), commonly referred to as the ''Orange Book'' in 1983 [4] . Of note, the Orange Book set basic requirements for assessing the effectiveness of security controls built into computer systems and was primarily used to evaluate, classify, and select computer systems for processing, storage, and retrieval of sensitive or classified information. Despite their focus on computer security, early works recognized the foundational systems nature of their task [6] . For example, the 1970 Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer Security concluded that providing satisfactory security controls in a computer system is itself a system design problem [6] . Moreover, the board specifically identified security as a systems problem: ''a combination of hardware, software, communications, physical, personnel, policy and procedural safeguards'' [6] .
In 1989, the DoD formalized this systems security concept in Military Standard 1785 (MIL-STD 1785), which defined the technical and managerial aspects of SSE for the first time [7] . Subsequently, the National Security Agency (NSA) created a draft set of secure design principles in 1993, which emerged from a study on rules for system composition [8] , [35] . While not a finished effort, the study represented collective wisdom that needed to stand the test of time, and perhaps more importantly, practice. Additionally, in response to recommendations by the US National Research Council in December of 1990 to promulgate comprehensive, generally accepted security principles, the International Information Security Foundation (IISF) began drafting the Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) [8] , [9] . Originally drafted in 1992, it was left unfinished until its adoption by NIST in 1996 (NIST SP 800-14 Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Security Information Technology Systems [10] ) and later the Information Systems Security Association in 2003 (Generally Accepted Information Security Principles [9] ).IT Focused Security Efforts While initial systems security efforts served to protect information systems well, a holistic systems-oriented view of security was largely overshadowed by the rapid development of network security and information assurance during the IT bubble of the 1990s and early 2000s. In the meantime, other countries began their own initiatives to develop evaluation criteria influenced largely by the concepts presented in the United States' TCSEC. These included the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), published in 1991 by the Commission of the European Communities (largely based on works from France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) [11] , as well as, the Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC), published in 1993 by the Communications Security Establishment [12] . The TCSEC, ITSEC, and CTCPEC efforts eventually culminated in an international collaboration in 1999 to produce ISO/IEC 15408: Information technology -Security techniques -Evaluation criteria for IT security, otherwise known as the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (often abbreviated as ''Common Criteria'' or simply ''CC''). The Common Criteria provides a shared set of requirements for the security functionality of IT products and for assurance measures applied to these technologies [13] .
B. A RESURGENCE OF SYSTEMS-ORIENTED SECURITY
More recently, a collaborative effort between NIST and NSA was formed in 2010 to continue the systems approach to security MIL-STD 1785 began some 20 years prior. In 2012, the initial public draft of NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security Engineering was published (with the full release version published November 2016), providing a comprehensive description of systems-oriented security engineering considerations [2] , [14] . Likewise, in 2011 the United States DoD publicly acknowledged the need for an integrated approach for developing secure systems as they revitalized their SSE approach through established methodologies such as Program Protection Planning (i.e., SE processes throughout the system lifecycle) [1] , [15] . Similarly, the on-line Guide to the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (SEBoK) recognizes that the primary objective of SSE is to apply SE principles and practices during all system development phases in order to minimize (or contain) system vulnerabilities to known and postulated security threats, ensuring that developed systems are adequately protected [16] .
C. MODERN SSE CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKS
In this section we introduce foundational SSE concepts and review several popular security frameworks. Experience has shown that systems often exhibit behaviors that are unanticipated in the design process, even when formal design process exists [5] . Fundamental analysis of system security, and thus risk to successful mission execution, requires necessarily anticipating conditions in which the SoI is forced outside its normal operating constraints. Furthermore, these analyses are complicated by the high degree of connectivity between independently managed systems, where formal assessments can be prohibited by the affected systems' management [17] .
With regard to the challenge of developing secure systems, security expert Ross Anderson observed that security engineering is about building systems to remain reliable through intentional and unintentional disruption, to include malice, error, or mischief [18] . In the same respect, the need for cyber resiliency has been increasingly recognized in recent years; there is a need for information and communications systems and the missions and business functions which depend on them to be resilient under attacks focused on cyber resources [41] . Thus, SSE has two predominate roles within the larger SE effort:
• Engineering the security functions that provide system security protection
• Engineering the security-driven constraints on the entire system Note, a possible third role exists in the engineering of protection for life cycle assets as exemplified in aspects of DoD Program Protection [15] . Successful execution of these roles requires a tailored SSE ''presence'' throughout the 30 SE life cycle processes of ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 [5] . While meta-engineering SSE methodologies may exist, such as the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) (which has evolved into ISO/IEC 21827), the majority of security literature speaks to security only from an IT or cybersecurity perspective [44] . For example, two of the most predominantly exercised methodologies and frameworks for understanding, developing, and fielding secure systems are the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) [19] and the ISO/IEC 27002: Information technology -Security techniques -Code of practice for information security management [20] . The CISSP provides a Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) relevant to information security professionals and establishes a common framework for information security terms and principles which allows professionals to discuss, debate, and resolve related matters with a common understanding [19] . Conversely, the ISO/IEC 27002 provides recommendations on IT and cybersecurity management for use by those responsible for initiating, implementing or maintaining IT and cybersecurity security management systems [20] .
On the other hand, methodologies like the SSE-CMM deliver the necessary roadmap for adopting organizationwide security engineering practices, but do not specifically point out any tools or techniques that can be used to help reach the goals described in the process areas [44] , [45] . They are rather used as a means for engineering organizations to evaluate their existing security engineering practices and define improvements to them [44] , [45] .
Summarized in Table 1 [22] ; the International Information System Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2 CISSP CBK [19] ; the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, an annex to their National Infrastructure Protection Plan [23] ; and the DHS Catalog of Control Systems Security for protecting critical infrastructure [24] . Collectively, these works outline provisions for establishing a minimum baseline or system-agnostic security considerations (each from their respective area), which are often acknowledged in multiple concepts or frameworks (as described in Section III). While this is not an exhaustive list of all existing security frameworks, it endeavors to be representative sample of these frameworks. In particular, there work offers representation for traditional IT and cybersecurity systems, cyber-physical systems, transportation systems, industrial control systems, and government requirements on similar systems; this subset provides a diverse yet comprehensive sampling of possible systems. 
III. EXAMINING THE SYSTEMS SECURITY DOMAINS
This section proposes seven abstracted systems security domains to broadly describe a ''system-agnostic'' approach for universally understanding and categorizing systems security concerns into distinct domains. In Table 2 , we map the six frameworks and their associated domains from Table 1 into seven recommended system-agnostic domains. The abstracted domains are intended to serve as a common baseline for implementing SSE while thoroughly understanding and discussing the systems security problem in addition to building confidence in inter-organizational activities such as developing security standards and effective security practices. These domains also infer that the complexity and diversity of security needs and domains that contribute to system security is indeed ''defense in depth,'' a commonly applied architecture and design approach which implements a composition of various defenses and countermeasures to provide multiple opportunities to stop an attack using different techniques and/or tools in the event a security control fails [19] .
Note that systems developers (i.e., practicing Systems Engineers) may partition security into domains with varying detail and specificity. As such, the existing security domains may not map directly to the proposed system-agnostic domains; however, the goal is merely to map the domains as close as possible in order to represent the intention of the domain as described by its framework. For example, the Asset Management domain can be further partitioned into hardware, software, and operating systems to more specifically account for physical material and components (e.g., hard drives, car doors, fuselages, etc.), the mechanisms used to provide functionality to systems (e.g., human-machine interfaces, hardware logic, software applications, etc.), and the platform that the applications reside on (e.g., operating systems, virtual machines, web interfaces, etc.). The problem with this systems security approach, though, is the translation from one framework to another: the concepts are similar but often expressed with varying lexicon. Also, some domains may have interdependencies with other domains that may need to be considered, such as communications and network equipment (Interconnectivity) needing to be managed (Asset Management) and protected (Physical and Environmental security).
A. COMPLIANCE
Compliance addresses the security policies of the organization, provides the organization direction, and supports security in accordance with business or mission requirements, alongside applicable legal, statutory, and regulatory requirements. While many believe security is primarily based on locks and walls to prevent access, there are many times when security depends on deterrence including the possibility of punishment; this is the role of policy and laws [25] . For example, while cars have door locks, it is often the possibility of a thief getting caught and sent to jail, which, while small, is large enough to deter all but the most determined criminals.
As such, there are many different forms of punishment to include fines, ostracism, firing, jail, and other creative alternatives that can be incorporated into compliance policies and laws [25] .
This domain also serves as an important form of internal control to limit unwanted behaviors from employees and includes investigative measures to determine if an incident has occurred as well as the processes for responding to such incidents. Well-written policies convey to employees what is expected of them, leaving the organization free to focus on other security and management priorities. Additionally, adherence to compliance requirements also helps to maintain a degree of accountability in the eyes of external (and internal) stakeholders.
B. PEOPLE
Because modern systems currently, and will continue to, depend on people for development and operation, most vulnerabilities tend to occur at the human level [26] , [39] . For example, Kevin Mitnick, a computer security consultant once known as the world's most wanted hacker, stated that as ''better security technologies, [make] it increasingly difficult to exploit technical vulnerabilities. . . attackers will turn more and more to exploiting the human element'' [26] . His work recognizes that attackers pay more attention to the human element in security than most system developers have, and consequently hackers have managed to successfully exploit this advantage repeatedly with little investment and minimal risk. Therefore, the security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third parties are critically important and should be defined and documented in accordance with the organization's policies and overall competitive strategy. At a minimum, background checks on all potential employees should be conducted in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and ethics in relation to the business needs and the perceived risks [20] .
Furthermore, motivation to comply is often based on the users' understanding of why their actions and behaviors can put organizational assets at risk [26] . Education, training, and certification needs to instill personal and collective responsibility in all users to include security designers, administrators, decision makers, and end users. Note there is a point of distinction to make between education and training: education is largely about teaching concepts and skills whereas training aims to change behavior through drill, monitoring, feedback, reinforcement, and punishment [26] . By incorporating both security education and training into every task the user does, the organization puts security into the forefront of people's minds on a daily basis, which allows them to focus on the necessary actions to protect themselves, as well as, the organization's data, networks, and systems.
C. SYSTEM RESILIENCY
The system must also be able to continue its mission during critical failures while protecting its people and assets regardless of internal and external conflict or attacks, unforeseen environmental or operational changes, and system malfunctions [28], [29] . While each component of the system itself may be secure and reliable, demonstrating (or proving) that the whole system is resilient becomes much harder. System Resiliency requires processes to identify and mitigate design, production, test, and field support deficiencies which threaten mission success [27] . Additionally, resiliency with respect to system security also means providing justified confidence that the SoI security functions as only intended and is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the system [27] .
The complete system must meet stakeholder expectations and needs while also addressing their security concerns by performing traceability of system security requirements. Note that the stakeholder requirements are the results of requirements analysis to transform the informal needs, expectations, and concerns into something that can be delivered. The system requirements transform the stakeholder expression into the technical solution that will be delivered. To be effective, claims should be addressed early and proportionately with stakeholder needs and expected threats. Activities should include a planned systematic set of multi-disciplinary activities to achieve adequate evidence for system resiliency and manage the risk of exploitable vulnerabilities [27] . Incorrectly addressing concerns late in the engineering process could result in the system being misused, resulting in unnecessary costs or delays in full system operations [27] .
D. OPERATIONS
Operations security (and by extension sustainment, maintenance, and logistics) focuses on providing system availability for end users while protecting sensitive data and important resources [19] , [20] . From a systems-level perspective, Operations includes the collection of mechanisms and procedures that allow system managers to exercise directive or restrictive influence over the behavior, use, and content of the system; however, due to the prevailing nature of software applications in today's systems, it is important to note that fundamental cybersecurity principals from programs and standards such as the CISSP and the ISO/IEC 27002 have a large impact in securing this domain. Properties such as access control, cryptography, application development, and information security play crucial roles in keeping this domain secure. For example, access control permits management to specify what users or processes can do, which resources they can access, and what operations they can perform on a system [19] .
E. PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
Physical and environmental security addresses the physical and procedural issues that exist in the environment in which the SoI is to be deployed and operated/sustained. This domain is concerned with the prevention of unauthorized physical access, damage, and interference to the system, as well as measures to prevent loss, damage, theft, or compromise of assets [20] . Some systems may require more physical security considerations than other systems due to a tightly VOLUME 5, 2017 coupled cyber-physical relationship. For example, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) like power plants or waste water treatment plants are considered critical infrastructures which merit higher levels of physical security in order to prevent tampering. Similarly, classified or consolidated IT systems such as military networks and service delivery points may also warrant high levels of physical security due to the sensitive and important nature of the service they provide. Conversely, conventional organizational IT systems (e.g., servers, desktop computers, etc.), may not require significant physical security consideration because these systems are often integrated into larger systems or ''businesses'' in which physical security has already been provided.
F. ASSET MANAGEMENT
Asset management describes the assets that the SoI utilizes to operate such as people, intellectual property, system components, and the acquisition of such assets (i.e., supply chain management). This domain encompasses both high-level and more detailed processes, concepts, principles, structures, and standards used to define, design, implement, monitor, and secure/assure operating systems, applications, equipment, and networks [19] . For data components, the domain should also clearly integrate various levels of confidentiality, integrity, and availability to ensure effective operations and adherence to governance. This domain can be further subdivided into three components:
1) HARDWARE
Of the many components that compose a technological product, and ultimately the system, most contain elements from the broader global market, making it difficult to establish the trustworthiness and security of an end product [30] . As demand drives competition, many companies are forced to outsource in order to lower costs and remain competitive. This can be seen in the U.S. computer manufacturing sector, which in the first half of the decade has declined at an annual rate of 21.8 percent as computer manufacturing has increasingly moved abroad [30] . As manufacturers lose direct control of production quality and product integrity, this outsourcing process can be misused by others to introduce malicious logic into unsuspecting devices. More often than not, hardware failure or cyber-attacks would likely be suspected before malicious hardware, especially since diagnostic tests might not find proof of malicious actions [30] . These devices may also contain hidden backdoors which are equally difficult to detect.
2) SOFTWARE
Software (applications or firmware) can also be subject to compromise as complex systems are typically implemented by a large number of developers across a number of companies [1] . In March 2013, a study by the International Data Corporation found that ''at least a third of all PC software is counterfeit'' because of its nonphysical nature [30] , significantly increasing the potential for malware infection and application performance degradation. Conversely, sometimes vulnerabilities in technology are simply design or implementation mistakes; however, malicious or not, vulnerabilities in software can be, and often are, used for malicious ends, be it cyber-attacks or espionage [36] .
3) OPERATING SYSTEMS
Operating systems are also subject to multiple programmers or outsourcing, which, like in the case of hardware and software, can introduce supply chain compromises. Modern operating systems contain millions of lines of codes with numerous undetected or undetectable vulnerabilities. Because of the crucial role of the operating system in any computing system, the security (or lack thereof) of an operating system has a significant impact on the overall security of the system, including the security of dependent applications (i.e., the software running on the operating system) [31] . Lack of proper control and containment of execution of individual applications in an operating system may lead to attack or break-in from one application to other applications [31] .
G. INTERCONNECTIVITY
Communications and network security can be described as the cornerstones of information security, being one of the most central assets to the information environment of any system [38] . Loss of interconnectivity can have devastating consequences on the SoI and its ability to operate, which often leads to mission failure. This domain then refers to not only the transmission methods and security measures used to provide integrity, availability, and confidentiality of data during transfer over private and public communication networks but also the intercommunication between components within a system, such as a vehicle control area network bus which allows microcontrollers and other devices in a vehicle to communicate with each other without the presence of a host computer. Likewise, using the appropriate security protocols ensures that security and integrity of data in transit persist as these protocols are primarily designed to prevent any unauthorized user, application, service, or device from accessing data by implementing various cryptography and encryption techniques.
IV. EXAMPLE PRIORITIZATION SCHEMES
This section provides three example prioritization schemes (i.e., possible interpretations) using available frameworks to demonstrate the utility of the system-agnostic domains. It is also important to note that many organizations adopt control frameworks to provide a governance structure that is consistent, measurable, standardized, comprehensive, and modular [19] ; however, there is often no standard or methodology for determining the ''criticality'' or importance of such efforts with respect to existing security domains. Thus, information about each domain must be considered and combined by SMEs to get a true understanding of its priority and determine proper courses of action. For example, should developmental and operational tests lack adequate SSE process controls and appropriate design features, planning and engineering efforts could be wasted if vulnerabilities go undiscovered.
Decisions regarding when, where, and how these systemagnostic security domains should be used are best determined by the specific industry sectors and the SMEs associated with those systems. Thus, these examples are not intended to replace the need for applying sound engineering judgment, established best practices, or risk assessments, but rather function as an example use case for further analysis and consideration for engineering complex systems. More specifically, we examine three well-established frameworks and attempt to create mappings from their criticality assessment back to the system-agnostic security domains described in Section III. In this way, we construct prioritization schemes that determine, based on what controls is assumed to matter more for the system or organization, how to organize the security domains in level of importance for the system developer.
Note, the notion of using a weighted priority scheme (i.e., using multiplicative factors to influence the perceived importance of particular categories or domains) allows for a finer level of granularity and detail, but was ultimately omitted in this work in order to minimize the complexity of the issue and prevent possible obfuscation of the necessary components. To provide a broad systems security perspective and demonstrate wide applicability, we addressed security guidance from the conventional IT industry [32] , government specific acquisition [15] , and critical infrastructure [24] . It must be emphasized again that as these are sample scenarios, the values and order of importance may change depending on the background and expertise of the individual or individuals implementing this concept.
A. NIST SP 800-53 REVISION 4
The first example is the NIST SP 800-53r4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, consisting of 285 controls in 19 families [32] . This publication provides for the ability to scope and tailor controls to an organization's specific mission (or user requirements) and provides best practice recommendations for information security management by those initiating, implementing, or maintaining information security systems. By categorizing the 19 control families and mapping them back to the proposed security domains, we derive Table 3 . These 19 control families are listed along the left column of Table 3 and serve as consideration or control factors to help determine how much a given security domain would impact or influence the system, as determined by the SME. While the NIST SP 800-53r4 provides a holistic approach to information security by providing the breadth and depth of security controls necessary to fundamentally strengthen information systems and the environments in which those systems operate, this assessment looks to apply those same security control families as a set of defined requirements used to satisfy the system-agnostic security domains.
With respect to the sums in Table 3 , once each control is associated with its respective security domains, we can assert that larger security domain values imply a more weighted or critical importance to the system utilizing this particular prioritization scheme. For example, the Media Protection control family can apply directly to the Physical and Environmental security domain as well as the Asset Management domain. For this particular scheme then, Compliance should be weighted more heavily than the commonly emphasized Operations security domain. While all security domains are important, this prioritization allows IT-focused organizations to focus their resources more specifically.
B. DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK
In 2012, the Defense Science Board Task Force concluded that the cyber threat was serious and that the United States could not be confident that its critical information and cyber systems would work under sophisticated and well-resourced cyber attacks [40] . While the DoD takes great care to secure the use and operation of its weapon systems, its networks are built on inherently insecure architectures that are increasingly composed of foreign assets [40] . The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) provides details on integrating classical systems engineering processes for mitigating and managing risks to unprecedented technologies and mission-critical system functionality throughout the acquisition lifecycle [15] . More specifically, Chapter 13 of the DAG (Program Protection) provides detailed procedural steps in performing criticality analysis, the DoD's method by which missioncritical components and information are identified and prioritized. In essence, program protection seeks to defend warfighting capabilities by keeping secret things from getting out and malicious things from getting in [15] , [37] .
Leveraging this methodology, another example prioritization scheme is generated, as shown in Table 4 . Here, the criticality analysis procedural steps are assessed against the security domains, which we treat like critical components and information for mission-critical functions. From these results, we assert that security domains with larger sum values imply more importance to the SoI. In this example, System Resiliency and Asset Management share equally high sum priorities of ''3''.
C. SCADA SECURITY POLICY FRAMEWORK
The final prioritization example uses the Framework for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Security Policy, developed by Sandia National Laboratories in an effort to ease the creation of SCADA security policies and ensuring coverage over all critical areas of SCADA security as well as flexibility in developing customized policies for specific operations [33] . Because SCADA systems are often used to control time-critical functions, standard IT security practices may not be particularly suitable for SCADA systems [33] .
Although the framework describes a methodology to creating SCADA specific policy documents, the policy itself translates the organization's desired security and reliability control objectives into enforceable direction and behavior for the staff to ensure secure design, implementation, and operation [33] . In this fashion, we strive not to explicitly exclude this type of framework from applicability in our system-agnostic approach. As shown in Table 4 , we can rationally map each category to the system-agnostic security domains to create a SCADA specific prioritization scheme. Again, the larger the sum value for a security domain implies more importance of that domain to the system. In this example, the domain of most concern is the Asset Management domain with a value of ''4''. Tables 3, 4 , and 5 demonstrate that the prioritization orders for the three system frameworks are vastly different from one another given these specific mappings (which presumably represent the stakeholders' priorities). For example, the NIST SP 800-53r4 prioritizes Compliance whereas the DAG is more inclined to require fairly equal attention in System Resiliency as well as Asset Management. These results show that the proposed system-agnostic security domains can serve as a basis for further developing and tailoring systems specific security frameworks, processes, and requirements efforts. By utilizing and extending this concept with well-established SSE processes, activities, and tasks, we desire to increase understanding of SSE approaches in order to focus limited resources and maximize return on investment.
D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SSE DOMAINS

V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper provides a comprehensive description of foundational SSE concepts and frameworks for the interested reader, and proposes seven system-agnostic security domains for consideration to prioritize and address system security issues in complex systems. In contrast to the preponderance of ''cyber'' focused security research, this work focuses more holistically on SSE in order to create a system-agnostic approach for various types and classes of systems to include: cyber-physical, transportation, weapons systems, and other complex systems or systems of systems.
The abstracted domains allow users and practitioners to focus on systems in general as opposed to specific systems designed for a specialized purpose. While more attention to detail can be given by a SME to his/her particular system, this preliminary approach allows for a standard baseline to be created such that new practitioners in the field have a starting guide to developing secure systems of their own. This work could potentially save, at the very least, the initial cost of understanding the majority of non-specialized security requirements, to providing an effective method for prioritizing and quantifying such an approach for systems in development.
In future efforts, we desire to re-evaluate the proposed list of system-agnostic domains and further elaborate on them as well as appending overlooked domains into the current decomposition. We also seek to incorporate our assessment methods alongside NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems to aid in the development of trustworthy secure systems that are fully capable of supporting critical missions and business operations while meeting stakeholder security objectives and protection needs [14] . Thus, we desire to investigate the tailorable nature of NIST SP 800-160 and explore how to more efficiently apply the SSE processes, activities, and tasks to various SoI (e.g., smart vehicles, major weapon systems, and industrial control systems). Our research goal is to more fully understand an effective systems security approach, increase the manageability of SSE efforts, and provide cost effective SSE solutions.
